Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Commitment of Sex Offenders by Maas, Warren J.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 4 Article 12
2003
Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Commitment
of Sex Offenders
Warren J. Maas
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Maas, Warren J. (2003) "Erosion of Constitutional Rights in Commitment of Sex Offenders," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 29: Iss.
4, Article 12.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/12
MAAS_FORMATTED 3/27/2003 11:50 PM
1241
EROSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN 
COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS
Warren J. Maas†
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................1241
II. THE COMMITMENT PROCESS..............................................1245
A. The Starting Point: The “Utter Lack of Power to Control
Sexual Impulses” Standard.................................1245
B. Lowering the Bar: SDP Act and Volitional Impairment....1248
C. Erosion of the “Utter Lack of Power to Control Sexual 
Impulses” Standard: Role of Psychological and 
Psychiatric Experts .............................................1251
III. DUE PROCESS AFTER THE COMMITMENT: TREATMENT,
QUASI-TREATMENT OR PSEUDO-TREATMENT .....................1255
A. Using Findings of Fact in Treatment..............................1259
B. Using Polygraph in Treatment ......................................1261
C. Emphasis of Confinement is Security Not Therapy ...........1262
D. Constitutional Challenges to Discharge Criteria...............1265
IV. CONCLUSION.....................................................................1267
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a number of highly publicized homicides involving 
sexual assaults by recent parolees in the late 1980s,1 a task force 
from the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office2 recommended, 
among other interventions, the use of a rarely used 1939 Sexual 
       †     Coordinator of the Hennepin County Commitment Defense Project.  Mr. 
Maas is a Licensed Psychologist (M.A. from Minnesota State University - Mankato, 
1980) and a practicing attorney (J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law, 1986, 
admitted to practice April 1986).
1. Julie A. Hoffman, Humphrey Asks [for] Tougher Sentences for Rapists, SAINT
PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, June 27, 1988, at A5; Marna J. Johnson, Minnesota’s
Sexual Psychopathic Personality and Sexually Dangerous Person Statute: Throwing Away 
the Key, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1996).
2. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN, FINAL REPORT (1989).
1
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Psychopathic Personality Statute.3  This statute was originally used 
to civilly commit individuals who were deemed to have sexual 
disorders rendering them incapable of control over their behavior.
Shortly after its passage in 1939, the Sexual Psychopathic
Personality [“SPP”] statute was challenged in the Minnesota
Supreme Court4 and reviewed by the United States Supreme 
Court.5  These cases narrowed the SPP statute, allowing civil
commitment only on specific grounds.6  The United States
Supreme Court adopted the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
construction of the statute when it stated:
[The statute] intended to include those persons who, by a 
habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have 
evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses
and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict 
injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.7
Beginning in the late 1980s, attorneys used this statute to 
invoke commitment at the end of the sentences for selected sex 
offenders.8  Because commitment is a civil procedure, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held the process was not double
jeopardy.9  Attorneys for the proposed patients, on the other hand, 
3. MINN. STAT. §§ 526.09, 526.10 (1994), re-codified as MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, 
subd. 18(b) (1998), and re-titled Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, Act of 
Aug. 31, 1994, ch.1, art.1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 5-9 (1994 1st spec. sess.).  The 
current version defines a sexual psychopathic personality as follows:
Sexual psychopathic personality means the existence in any person of 
such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, 
or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to
appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any 
of these conditions, which render the person irresponsible for personal 
conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person has evidenced, by 
a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, an utter lack of 
power to control the person’s sexual impulses and, as a result, is 
dangerous to other persons.
Id.
4. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 
287 N.W. 297 (1939).
5. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 
(1940).
6. Id. at 275-76 (describing procedural safeguards authorized by the statute 
to protect due process).
7. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
8. STATE OF MINN., PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
AUDITOR, PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY COMMITMENT LAW 11 (1994). See also,
Johnson, supra note 1, at 1150-51.
9. In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d 638, 646-47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d, 510 
2
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argued that the commitment proceedings were a transparent 
attempt to extend the confinement of sex offenders who would 
otherwise be eligible for parole.10
Consequently, the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Linehan 
[“Linehan I”]11 overturned a commitment for psychopathic
personality because the Ramsey County District Court failed to find 
the “utter lack of power to control sexual impulses” required for
commitment under the SPP statute.12  In response, the Minnesota 
Legislature passed the Sexually Dangerous Person [“SDP”]13
statute, which indicated that proof of an “utter lack of power to 
control sexual impulses” was not necessary.14  In an immediate 
challenge, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the SDP statute in 
In re Linehan [“Linehan II”].15  Minnesota, therefore, has two statutes 
for the commitment of sex offenders: the Sexual Psychopathic 
Personality statute16 and the Sexually Dangerous Person statute.17  A 
superficial viewing of the two statutes suggests that the SPP statute 
has a higher standard for commitment (utter lack of power to 
control sexual impulses) than the SDP statute (power to control is 
specifically excluded as an element).  Just how high the standard is 
for commitment under the SPP statute is discussed below.
Balancing the competing policies of public safety and personal 
N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 849 (1994); see also Call v. Gomez, 
535 N.W.2d 312, 319-20 (Minn. 1995) (holding “commitment under the
psychopathic personality statute is remedial and does not constitute double
jeopardy because it is for treatment purposes and is not for purposes of
preventative detention”).
10. See, e.g., C. Peter Erlinder, Minnesota’s Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the 
“Politically Ill,” 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 99, 124-25 (1993).
11. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994).
12. Id. at 614.
13. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998).  The statute states:
(a) A “[s]exually dangerous person” means a person who:
(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as defined in 
subdivision 7a;
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or 
dysfunction; and,
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct as 
defined in subdivision 7a.
(b) For purposes of this provision, it is not necessary to prove that the 
person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses.
14. Id. at subd. 18c(b); see also, Johnson, supra note 1, at 1173-74.
15. In re Linehan [Linehan II], 557 N.W.2d 171, 191 (Minn. 1996).
16. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18(b) (1998).
17. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 18(c).
3
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freedom, commitments under the SPP and SDP statutes present a 
particular challenge because an extremely unpopular group of 
people pose a potential societal danger.18  Following the Attorney 
General’s report, many predicted the SPP statute would be used for 
preventive and continued detention of violent offenders at the end 
of their sentences.19  This prediction has yet to be disproved.  Since 
the State of Minnesota began using the SPP statute for
commitment of offenders after their prison terms, only one patient
has been placed on provisional discharge while more than 170 
offenders remain in “treatment” more than a decade after their 
initial commitments.20
The premise of this article is that under the SPP/SDP statutes, 
substantive due process for persons alleged to be sexual predators 
has greatly eroded and the rationale for allowing such erosion—the
promise of rehabilitation under the SPP/SDP statutes for these 
men—is of questionable validity.  This article will discuss the
erosion of strict due process protections that are justified by
questionable arguments of increased public protection.  A due 
process analysis does not stop at the end of the commitment 
proceeding.  Determining if due process requirements are  satisfied 
requires an examination of what transpires after the commitment 
hearing.  When the courts ignore the fact that treatment is not 
working, proposed patients are indeterminately committed to 
unproven treatment programs, negating one justification for the 
commitment.  In other words, double jeopardy becomes an issue if 
commitment is shown to be a sham.  This article will: (1) describe 
the development of commitment law to date, detailing the
relaxation of due process standards; (2) discuss further areas of 
current litigation relating to the commitment process and attempts 
to preserve substantive due process; and (3) discuss the due process 
18. Protecting Against Sexual Predators, Editorial, STAR TRIBUNE, July 21, 1991, at 
22a.
19. See cases cited supra note 9. Preventive detention has become to some 
degree an acceptable concept. See, Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay 
on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U.L. REV. 113, 115 (1996) (“[T]he general argument is 
that although some preventive detention can be theoretically justified, the
increased use of preventive detention would be unwise because the resulting 
increase in safety would not justify the corresponding massive liberty
deprivation.”).
20. No individual admitted since 1983 has been granted a direct discharge.
No individual committed after 1988 was on provisional discharge as of December 
1999.  Eric S. Janus, An Empirical Study of Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment
Program, 1 SEX OFFENDER LAW REPORT, 49, 50 (2000).
4
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implications of the virtual absence of treatment completion.
II. THE COMMITMENT PROCESS
A. The Starting Point: The “Utter Lack of Power to Control 
Sexual Impulses” Standard
Civil commitment is state-sanctioned physical confinement, 
historically used for the purpose of providing necessary treatment
to mentally ill persons who refuse treatment on their own.21  There 
is a tension between two competing philosophies in the law of civil 
commitment.22  The libertarian model holds that civil commitment 
should be applied sparingly for the limited purpose of protecting 
the public from harm by persons suffering from psychiatric
maladies.23  The paternalistic model seeks to use state intervention 
(commitment) as a vehicle to give help to anyone who needs it.24
The Minnesota commitment statute prior to 1982 was more 
paternalistic than its successor law.  In 1982, the legislature passed 
the Minnesota Commitment Act.  This act defines the following 
categories of civil commitment: mentally ill persons,25 chemically 
dependent persons,26 mentally retarded persons,27 persons mentally 
ill and dangerous to the public,28 sexual psychopathic
personalities,29 and sexually dangerous persons.30  Of these
categories, mentally ill persons, chemically dependent persons, 
mentally retarded persons, and persons mentally ill and dangerous
to the public were part of the original Commitment Act of 1982.31
In 1982, the SPP statute was referred to in another chapter of the 
statutes.32  Later, in 1994, the legislature codified the SPP statute as 
part of Chapter 253B33 and at the same time the legislature drafted 
21. Baily v. Noot, 324 N.W.2d 164, 167 (Minn. 1982).
22. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 636 (West Group, 3d ed. 1999).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (2002).
26. Id., subd. 2.
27. Id., subd. 14.
28. Id., subd. 17.
29. Id., subd. 18b.
30. Id., subd. 18c.
31. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (1982).
32. MINN. STAT. § 526.09-.10 (1982).
33. 1995 Minn. Laws, 1994 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 1, art. 1.
5
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and added the SDP statute as part of Chapter 253B.34
Recognizing that civil commitment was a massive intrusion 
into a person’s fundamental right to physical liberty,35 the United 
States Supreme Court insisted that clear and convincing proof must 
be met prior to forced confinement for the purpose of
“treatment.”36  In cases of committing mentally ill persons,
chemically dependent persons, and mentally retarded persons, a 
petitioner must demonstrate that a person has a requisite
behavioral disability and that, as a result of the disability, there is a 
threat to their safety or the safety of others.37  Mentally ill,
chemically dependent, and mentally retarded commitments are 
time limited38 and can be discharged by the treating institutions.
In the case of committing persons who are mentally ill and 
dangerous to the public, a much greater sanction is imposed.  The 
mentally ill and dangerous persons are confined in a secure facility 
and the commitment may be made indeterminate; that is, the 
person will be held until released through a lengthy administrative 
process.39  To commit a mentally ill and dangerous person, a 
petitioner must show that the person meets the criteria for mental 
illness and that there is a threat of serious physical harm to others
as demonstrated by a recent act.40
Commitments for sexual psychopathic personalities and
sexually dangerous persons, like commitments for mentally ill and 
dangerous persons, carry severe sanctions.  Sentences can be made 
indeterminate and persons committed as sexual psychopathic
personalities and sexually dangerous persons are held in secure 
facilities.41
Prior to the passage of the SDP statute in 1994, three levels of 
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 U.S. 715, 717 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967); Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 606 (1967).
36. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33. “[T]he State has no interest in confining 
individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally ill or if they do not pose some 
danger to themselves or others.” Id. at 426.
37. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (2002) (mentally ill person); id., subd. 2 
(chemically dependent person); id., subd. 14 (mentally retarded person).
38. MINN. STAT. § 253B.09, subd. 5 (2002).  Mentally retarded persons have 
the possibility of indeterminate commitment. MINN. STAT. § 253B.13, subd. 2 
(2002).
39. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 (2002).
40. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (2002) (“[T]he person has engaged in an 
overt act causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another[.]”).
41. MINN. STAT. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (2002).
6
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commitment could be identified.  First, the lowest level of harm, 
likelihood of harm to self or others, was used in cases involving 
mentally ill, chemically dependent, and mentally retarded
persons.42  It resulted in commitment for a certain time and easy 
discharge.  Second, serious physical harm to others was used in 
cases involving persons mentally ill and dangerous to the public.
Third, utter lack of power to control was used in sexual
psychopathic personality cases.  It resulted in indeterminate
commitments in secure facilities with restraints on discharge.  The 
commitment criteria for sexual psychopathic personalities has
subsequently become much less clear.43
The Minnesota law authorizing the non-criminal confinement 
of persons who have psychopathic personalities began with the 
passage of the SPP statute in 1939.44  This statute was quickly 
challenged on constitutional grounds.  Recognizing that the
statutory language45 was too vague, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
judicially narrowed the statute by holding that:
[T]he act is intended to include those persons who, by a 
habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have 
evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual 
impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or 
otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the 
objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.46
Because there was a distinct constitutional basis for non-
criminal confinement under the “utter lack of power to control” 
standard, the court defined a third standard, which met clear 
policies.47  Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Minnesota 
and several other states began to utilize commitments under this 
category for the continued confinement of sex offenders who were 
42. MINN. STAT. § 253B.10, subd. 5 (2002) (transfer to voluntary status); 
MINN. STAT. § 253B.12, subd. 2 (2002) (discharge if a report not timely
submitted).
43. See infra Part II.C.
44. See A Bill For An Act Relating to Persons Having a Psychopathic
Personality, ch. 369, § 1, 1939 Minn. Laws 712-13.
45. See id. (defining “psychopathic personality” to mean “the existence in any 
person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or 
lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the 
consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render 
such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and 
thereby dangerous to other persons”).
46. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 
555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
47. See infra notes 51–79 and accompanying text.
7
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eligible for supervised release.48  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the constitutionality of this method of confinement in 
Linehan I.49  In the first several commitments of the early 1990s, the 
focus of appeals was on the substantive due process requirement
that a civil commitment must be based on an “utter lack of power 
to control.” 50
Until the late 1980s and early 1990s, this was settled law.  It has 
since been changed in two ways, both of which erode the due 
process protections of people committed as sexual predators.  First, 
the standard was bypassed by the passage of the SDP statute.51
Second, the definition of “utter lack of power to control” has 
become quite vague.52
B. Lowering the Bar: SDP Act and Volitional Impairment
The constitutional standard of “utter lack of power to control” 
sexual impulses was assailed, ironically, due to a case that affirmed 
that standard.  In 1965, Dennis Linehan kidnapped, raped and 
killed a teenager53 named Barbara Iverson.  He pled guilty to 
kidnapping and was sentenced to forty years in prison.54  In 1975, 
he escaped from minimum security prison and was captured after 
sexually molesting twelve-year-old55 Tracy Liggett in Michigan.  He 
was imprisoned in Michigan for five years and returned to
Minnesota for twelve additional years56 before his scheduled
supervised release in December 1992.57  A petition for commitment 
as a psychopathic personality was filed before his release.58  The 
Ramsey County district court committed Linehan, who then
appealed.  His commitment was affirmed by the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals59 but overturned by the Minnesota Supreme Court.60
Following a public outcry, Governor Arne Carlson ordered
48. See supra note 2.
49. 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994).
50. Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 
952 (1992); In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
51. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b) (2002).
52. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.




57. Id. at 610.
58. Id. at 611.
59. In re Linehan, 503 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
60. Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994).
8
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Linehan detained and called a special session of the Legislature in 
the summer of 1994 to find a way to continue Linehan’s
confinement.61  The Legislature responded by enacting the SDP 
statute and re-codifying the SPP statute.62  The result permitted the
use of civil commitment for the confinement of sex offenders, 
leaving Minnesota with two statutes containing different standards 
for the indeterminate commitment of sexual predators.  The SPP 
statute retains the original high threshold of “utter lack of power to 
control sexual impulses” for commitment, while the SDP statute 
has a considerably lower threshold for commitment, requiring only 
harmful sexual conduct, the presence of a mental illness, character 
disorder or dysfunction, and the likelihood of re-offending.63  The 
language of the statute itself relieves the state of the need to prove 
lack of power to control sexual impulses.
The passage of the SDP statute, which specifically eliminated 
the criterion of “utter lack of power to control sexual impulses,”64
and the continued use of the SPP statute has given rise to various 
attempts in appellate courts to define the conditions under which a 
person may be civilly committed as a sex offender.65  Committed 
sex offenders attacked the SDP statute as inherently
unconstitutional, arguing that the deletion of the need to
demonstrate lack of control, or volitional impairment,
automatically invalidated this statute.66
Following the passage of the SDP Act, Ramsey County
committed Dennis Linehan; Linehan II67 affirmed the SDP statute.68
The question remaining is whether the new statutory standard has 
a limit.69  At first, a case from Kansas appeared to settle the issue.
61. Jack Coffman, Special Session Called for Wednesday: Bill on Sexual Psychopaths
Expected to Pass Quickly, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 30, 1994, at 1C.
62. Act of August 31, 1994, supra, note 3.
63. Id. Fifteen other states have commitments for sexual predation.  Eric S. 
Janus, An Empirical Study of Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program, 1 SEX
OFFENDER LAW REPORT, 49 (2000).
64. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 subd. 18c(b) (2002).  “For the purposes of this 
provision, it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the 
person’s impulses.” Id.
65. Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996), vacated by 522 U.S. 1011 (1997); 
In re Robb II, 622 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), review denied, (Minn. Apr. 17, 
2001); In re Preston, 629 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
66. See, e.g., Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d at 174.
67. 557 N.W.2d at 171.
68. Id. at 180; see Robb II, 622 N.W.2d at 576.
69. See generally, In re Linehan [Linehan IV], 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1049; In re Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260 
9
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The Kansas case, Kansas v. Hendricks,70 involved the commitment of 
a multiply-convicted child molester who admitted that he would 
probably re-offend if released.71  The trial court committed
Hendricks, and the Kansas Supreme Court reversed on the
grounds that the criteria for commitment, a mental abnormality 
and a likelihood of future danger, did not meet the constitutional 
requirements of mental illness and likelihood of future danger.72
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed 
the Kansas Supreme Court.73
The Hendricks Court reiterated the need for volitional control 
as a necessary element in the civil commitment of sex offenders.74
The court stated:
To the extent that the civil commitment statutes we have 
considered set forth criteria relating to an individual’s 
inability to control his dangerousness, the Kansas Act sets 
forth comparable criteria and Hendricks’ condition
doubtless satisfies those criteria.75
In a subsequent case, Kansas v. Crane, the United States 
Supreme Court held that volitional impairment was required.76
The dissent in Crane, joined by the author of Hendricks, was 
adamant that volitional impairment was not required.77
The majority in Crane held that some form of volitional
impairment is necessary for a sexual predator commitment.78  An 
open question, discussed in another article in this volume,79 is how 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
70. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
71. Id. at 354-55.
72. Id. at 356.
73. Id. at 371.
74. Id. at 360.
75. Id.
76. 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).
77. Id. at 419, 421-23.  Under Justice Scalia’s analysis, a finding of a mental
impairment is all that is necessary for commitment.  The hypothetical at the end 
of Scalia’s dissent, however, illustrates a basic misunderstanding of the historical 
basis for this type of commitment.  That is, his hypothetical is illustrative of a 
“mentally ill and dangerous to the public style” of commitment.  The hypothetical 
is that a person could be exercising complete control but be under a delusion that 
all women were coming on to him.  This is clearly within the realm of a psychosis,
therefore a commitment for mental illness, and in Minnesota, in all likelihood, 
would be a commitment for being mentally ill and dangerous.
78. Id. at 412, 414.
79. Eric S. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an
Empiracally-Based Prevention Policy be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1083,
1088-91 (2003).
10
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much volitional impairment is required for a commitment as a 
SDP.
In conjunction with Hendricks v. Kansas and before Crane, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Linehan, and 
vacated and remanded Linehan II.80  On remand, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court affirmed the commitment of Dennis Linehan 
under the SDP statute but held that the statutory removal of lack of 
control actually meant that the statute required “adequate
control.”81  Linehan subsequently filed for habeas corpus and the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Linehan’s commitment.82
Though relying on Hendricks rather than Crane, the court held that 
Minnesota’s standard of “adequate control” meets substantive due 
process.83
C. Erosion of the “Utter Lack of Power to Control Sexual Impulses” 
Standard: Role of Psychological and Psychiatric Experts
The SPP statute continues to be used,84 but the standard of 
“utter lack of power to control sexual impulses” has lost its force.
The definition of the standard has gone through such a
metamorphosis that its plain English meaning no longer applies.
Several cases have attached qualifiers to the definition that have 
nothing to do with volitional control, including the following: the 
offender’s relationship, or lack thereof, to the victim,85 refusal of 
80. 522 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1997).
81. Linehan IV, 594 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1049 
(1999).
82. 315 F.3d 920, 929 (8th Cir. 2003).
83. Id. at 927.
84. In 2002, six petitions for SPP were filed in Hennepin County.  Contrary to 
the perceptions of many, both statutes are used for commitment.  In an
Information Brief by the Research Department of the Minnesota House of
Representatives, Legislative Analyst Judith Zollar stated, “Minnesota law contains a 
second civil commitment law applicable to sexually dangerous persons, known as 
the ‘psychopathic personality’ commitment law.  It was enacted in the 1930s and 
has been replaced, from a practical standpoint, by the sexually dangerous persons 
civil commitment law.  It remains on the books, however, because there are 
individuals in the state treatment facilities who were originally committed
pursuant to the older law and remain subject to that commitment.” JUDITH
ZOLLAR, MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, SEX OFFENDERS
AND PREDATORY OFFENDERS: MINNESOTA CRIMINAL AND CIVIL REGULATORY LAWS,
2001-2002 Sess. at 22 n.5 (2002), available at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/sexofdr.pdf (last visited Mar. 5,
2003).
85. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
849 (1994) (considering the nature and frequency of party’s sexual assaults, 
11
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treatment and lack of relapse prevention plan,86 and exhibition of 
grooming behavior.87  The significant aspect of these cases is that it 
has distorted the common sense definition of “utter lack of power 
to control”88 and has created a non-clinical definition of a clinical 
concept.89  Thus, courts have attempted to construe the phrase 
“utter lack of power to control,” and in so doing, have lowered the 
substantive due process standard that it once stood for.
In addition, there is a blurring of the line between an expert 
witness and a finder of fact in the determination of “utter lack of 
power to control sexual impulses.”  Civil commitment requires the 
input of experts in mental health.90  Clearly, experts in human 
behavior are needed in SPP and SDP cases to answer questions 
related to issues of dangerousness, victim impact, and likeliness of 
re-offending.  However, there are elements of the commitment that 
appear to be of a psychological or psychiatric nature but are in fact 
legal in nature.
degree of violence involved, relationship, or lack thereof, between party and his 
victims, party’s attitude and mood, party’s medical and family history, results of 
psychological and psychiatric testing and evaluation, and such other factors as 
bear on party’s predatory sexual impulse and lack of power to control it).
86. See In re Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that 
refusal of treatment and lack of relapse prevention plan can show utter lack of 
control necessary for involuntary commitment under psychopathic personality 
statute). See also, In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 
(explaining how the court, in applying test to determine existence of psychopathic 
personality, will consider the nature and frequency of sexual assaults, degree of 
violence, relationship between offender and victims, offender’s attitude, mood, 
medical history, testing results, and other facts which weigh on predatory sexual 
impulse and lack of power to control it).
87. See In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Evidence that patient lacked control over sexual impulses supported his
commitment as psychopathic personality; patient had manifested pattern of
habitual sex offenses involving multiple victims over extended period of time, 
exhibited classic pedophilic grooming behavior, and failed to remove himself 
from situations that provided opportunity for similar offenses. Id.
88. A literal rendering of “utter lack of power to control” would never control 
his behavior. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992) (defining “utter” 
as “complete, absolute, entirely”). But see Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994).
The factors used in deciding “utter lack of power to control” modify a literal 
definition. Id.
89. “Power to control” or “volitional control” are subjects of psychological 
and psychiatric science.
90. See, e.g., In re Martinelli, 649 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(requiring expert testimony tying lack of control to a properly diagnosed mental 
abnormality before civil commitment may occur); In re Givens, No. P601060242, 
2002 WL 31554041, at *4 (Nov. 19, 2002) (observing that expert testimony is often 
used to assist the trier of fact when considering civil commitment).
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss4/12
MAAS_FORMATTED 3/27/2003 11:50 PM
2003] EROSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 1253
In In re Blodgett, In re Pirkl, In re Irwin, and In re Bieganowski, the 
Minnesota appellate courts have listed a number of factors which 
the trial courts consider in deciding if an “utter lack of power to 
control sexual impulses” exists.  These include: the nature and 
frequency of the party’s sexual assaults, degree of violence involved, 
relationship, or lack thereof, between the party and his victims, the 
party’s attitude and mood, the party’s medical and family history, 
results of psychological and psychiatric testing and evaluation;91
refusal of treatment and lack of relapse prevention plan;92 nature 
and frequency of sexual assaults, degree of violence, relationship 
between offender and victims, offender’s attitude, mood, medical 
history, and testing results;93 and, pattern of habitual sex offenses
involving multiple victims over an extended period of time,
exhibited classic pedophilic grooming behavior, and failing to 
remove himself from situations that provided the opportunity for 
similar offenses.94  These factors are legal factors, most of which 
contain elements from behavioral sciences.  Courts should
determine if the legal standard has been met by asking experts in 
psychology or psychiatry if any one of the factors has been
exhibited in a way that would affect the subject’s ability to control 
his sexual impulses.
It is, however, the practice of petitioners’ attorneys to ask 
behavioral experts if the legal standard itself has been met.
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 704 allows any witness to address the 
ultimate legal issue if it is contained in an otherwise admissible
question.95  Far from being questions “otherwise admissible that 
embrace the ultimate issue,”96 questions relating to whether a 
statutory or case law element has been met require no
psychological expertise.  Instead, these questions call for statutory 
interpretation, an area of expertise which psychologists are not 
competent to answer.  Whether a person meets a statutory or case 
law element is not substance that falls within the expertise of a 
psychologist.97  The questions do not entail descriptions of scientific 
91. See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994).
92. See Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
93. See Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
94. See Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
95. MINN. R. EVID. 704.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Robert C. Boruchowitz, Sexual Predator Law – The Nightmare in the 
Halls of Justice, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 827, 830 (1992) (noting that deciding 
whether a defendant meets the statutory definition of sexual predator is the jury’s 
13
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examination or terms of art to which psychologists are competent 
to testify.98
A judge should make an impartial decision rather than
relinquish that responsibility to an expert witness on a mixed 
question of fact and law.  Abdicating the trial court’s responsibility 
to take the facts and apply it to the law violates the clear standards 
of the case law and the evidentiary rules.  Case law requires the trial 
court to protect its decision-making authority, but does account for 
incidental testimony that may weigh on an ultimate issue:
Standing alone, the objection that the opinion of a
qualified witness is asked upon the very issue and the 
ultimate one for decision is not sufficient.  So long as the 
matter remains in the realm where opinion evidence is 
customarily resorted to, there is ordinarily no valid
objection to permitting a person who has qualified
himself to express an opinion upon the ultimate issue.
That is a matter well left to the discretion of the trial 
judge.  While in a will contest the opinion of a witness, lay 
or scientific, should not be asked as to the testator’s
capacity to make a valid will, there is certainly no
objection to questions concerning his ability to
comprehend his property and dispose of it
understandingly. 99
In SPP and SDP cases, the courts have permitted the expert 
witnesses to cross a bright line.100  The courts have placed the 
decision of who is to be committed in the hands of expert
witnesses.  Thus, psychologists and occasionally psychiatrists testify 
job, not a psychologist’s). See also Douglas R. Richmond, Regulating Expert 
Testimony, 62 MO. L. REV. 485, 530 (1997) (stating that expert witnesses must 
ultimately  testify to fact issues).
98. See generally WRIGHT & GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 
6285 (1977).
99. In re Olson, 223 N.W. 677, 681 (Minn. 1929). See also, In re Estate of Jenks, 
189 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn. 1971).
100. See State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982) (stating that 
opinions involving legal analysis or mixed questions of law and fact are deemed to 
be of no use to the jury); Conover v. N. States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 397, 403
(Minn. 1981) (stating that legal analysis by an expert is usually not admissible); 
Teslow v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 273 Minn. 309, 312, 141 N.W.2d 
507, 509 (1966) (explaining that purpose of expert testimony is to assist jury, not 
to take over its function); State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 368-69, 43 N.W. 62, 63 
(1889) (determining that the issue of insanity was for the jury to decide and that 
the question put to expert was properly disallowed); Behlke v. Conwed Corp., 474 
N.W.2d 351, 359 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that expert testimony is 
inadmissible if it takes the responsibility of deciding the ultimate fact).
14
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beyond their area of expertise and instead act as legal advisors.
Courts have also cited opinions of these expert witnesses in their 
findings of fact, thereby clearly abdicating their own role as finder 
of fact and law.101
The statutory definitions of SPP and SDP contain terms that 
are of clinical or scientific significance where an expert’s testimony 
would be of help to the finder of fact.  Psychologists and
psychiatrists are competent to answer whether habit is present, 
whether volition has been impaired, and what the risk of re-
offending may be.  These questions go to “ultimate issues” but are 
within the competence of psychologists and psychiatrists.  It is 
questions such as these that Minnesota Rule of Evidence 704 is 
designed to permit.
It is improper for a psychological expert to testify whether 
statutory criterion or an element from case law has been met.102
Time and again the appellate courts have drawn a line at which 
experts are to stop.103  There are limits to what an expert may 
testify.  Allowing experts to opine that a proposed patient has or 
has not met statutory criteria crosses this limit, and if relied on by 
the trial court to reach its conclusions, is an improper
abandonment of its role as finder of law.
III. DUE PROCESS AFTER THE COMMITMENT: TREATMENT,
QUASI-TREATMENT OR PSEUDO-TREATMENT
Two of the central tenets of our constitutional scheme of 
government are the proscriptions against double jeopardy and 
preventive detention.104  These issues have been litigated repeatedly 
101. In re Matter of Joseph Nathanial Givens, No. C4-02-995 (Minn. Nov. 19, 
2002).
102. E.g., State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 101 (Minn. 1992) (excluding
psychiatric testimony on whether defendant had requisite mens rea when he 
committed crime because a medical opinion cannot be properly elicited on a 
mixed question of law and fact); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 
1982) (stating that experts’ opinions involving legal analysis are not admissible 
because they do not help the jury find facts).
103. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richman, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 MO. L. REV.
485, 571 n.308 (1997) (citing cases in which a rule similar to Minnesota Rule of 
Evidence 704 was properly used to limit expert testimony).
104. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (quoting Blackstone’s 
Commentaries for the universal maxim of the common law of England that no 
man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same 
offense); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (protecting the presumption of 
innocence, only secured after centuries of struggle).
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in SPP/SDP matters.105  Concerns arise from the fact that a
nominally civil sanction106 is used to extend the confinement of 
persons who have served their sentences for crimes.  Double
jeopardy and preventive detention have been dismissed as defenses 
by the appellate courts, which have held that the confinement is 
not for punishment but for treatment.107  Nevertheless, jurists have 
expressed concern that SPP/SDP commitments come close to 
violating these proscriptions.108
Persons committed under the SPP or SDP statutes are
confined to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program [“MSOP”], 
which is facilitated in two locations: St. Peter, Minnesota (for 
admissions and discharges) and Moose Lake, Minnesota (for
programming).  Since 1990, only one person has been placed on 
provisional discharge.109  The absence of completion would suggest 
that as MSOP is currently operated, the primary purpose for the 
commitment is preventive detention.  Requiring commitment for 
treatment needs to be evaluated to determine if the end result is or 
is not de facto double jeopardy.
Prior to the passage of the SDP statute, the first major case 
dealing with the SPP statute was In re Blodgett.110  Phillip Blodgett 
was committed shortly before his scheduled release from a criminal 
sentence for burglary in 1991.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed the commitment.111  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
granted review and affirmed in a four to three decision.112  In 
upholding the commitment as constitutional, the majority stated 
that, inter alia:
105. Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d 171, 188 (Minn. 1996) (stating that Linehan failed 
to demonstrate that his commitment was “punishment” or that the treatment was a 
“sham”); Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319-20 (Minn. 1995) (showing that 
commitment is remedial and therefore does not violate the proscription against 
double jeopardy); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994) (explaining
the commitment hearing was not a retrial of the criminal matter but a hearing on 
the “new” issues of the elements of civil commitment).
106. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1996), the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that the Kansas commitment act was punitive in nature and therefore a 
criminal statute triggering double jeopardy.
107. Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d at 188; Call, 535 N.W.2d at 319-20;
Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d at 647.
108. See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 918 (Wahl, J., dissenting); Linehan II, 557 
N.W.2d at 201 (Page, J., dissenting).
109. Janus, supra note 20.
110. 510 N.W.2d at 910.
111. In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
112. Id.
16
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[I]t is not clear that treatment for the psychopathic
personality never works. . . . But even when treatment is 
problematic, and it often is, the state’s interest in the 
safety of others is no less legitimate and compelling.  So 
long as civil commitment is programmed to provide
treatment and periodic review, due process is provided.113
The opinion recited the statutory process by which a person 
committed as SPP/SDP theoretically can be released.  The
possibility of discharge was cited as justification for affirming the 
commitment.114  Clearly, the constitutionality of the SPP statute 
depends on effective, yet problematic, treatment that ultimately 
can lead to release.
Justice Rosalie Wahl, in a strong dissent,115 stated that the SPP 
statute violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and “is 
creating a system of wholesale preventive detention.”116  The Blodgett
dissent pointed out that “[d]ue process requires that the nature of 
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for 
which the individual is committed.”117  Justice Wahl opined that the 
SPP statute was tantamount to a lifetime confinement that was not 
premised on a criminal conviction or a mental illness.118  The 
dissent depended heavily on Foucha v. Louisiana,119 which held that 
dangerousness alone is not a sufficient constitutional reason to 
confine an individual.120  Further, Justice Wahl pointed out that the 
statute “does not provide for a confinement that is strictly limited 
in duration or, for that matter, limited in duration at all.”121  The 
dissent stated:
It is questionable whether [Blodgett] can show he is no 
longer in need of “inpatient treatment and supervision” 
when the very psychiatrists who are charged with treating 
him say there is no treatment for an antisocial personality 
disorder and that any “treatment” he could receive at the 
security hospital would be “sham” or “placebo” treatment 
with “no evidence at the end of spending time in these 
113. Id. at 916.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 918.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 921.
118. Id. at 924-25.
119. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
120. See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 920.
121. Id. at 923.
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groups that he would be less or more likely to commit the 
same crime.”122
Three years after Blodgett, Linehan II123 affirmed a commitment 
based on the new SDP statute.  Double jeopardy and preventive 
detention were again discussed.  In his dissent in Linehan II, Justice 
Page, who voted with the majority in Blodgett, stated, “While I did 
believe then, and still believe now, that our decision in Blodgett fit 
within constitutional limits, I also believe that with that decision we 
reached the extreme limits of constitutionality permitted
preventive detention.”124
Justice Page distinguished Blodgett from Linehan II on the basis 
of the intentional absence of a volitional control element.125  The 
concerns Justice Wahl raised in Blodgett apply with equal force to 
Linehan II and the SDP statute; that is, if the treatment is “sham” or 
“placebo” in nature, the statute runs afoul of constitutional
proscriptions against double jeopardy and preventive detention.126
Double jeopardy was also raised in the United States Supreme 
Court case of Kansas v. Hendricks.127  The Supreme Court came 
close to endorsing preventive detention:
Accepting the Kansas court’s apparent determination that 
treatment is not possible for this category of individuals 
does not obligate us to adopt its legal conclusions.  We 
have already observed that, under the appropriate
circumstances and when accompanied by proper
procedures, incapacitation may be a legitimate end of the 
civil law.128
The Court however pulled back from this, concluding:
Even if we accept this determination that the provision of 
treatment was not the Kansas Legislature’s “overriding” or
“primary” purpose in passing the Act, this does not rule 
out the possibility that an ancillary purpose of the Act was 
to provide treatment, and it does not require us to
conclude that the Act is punitive.  Indeed, critical
language in the Act itself demonstrates that the Secretary
[of Social and Rehabilitation Services], under whose
122. Id.
123. 557 N.W.2d 171, 191, 196 (Minn. 1996).
124. Id. at 201.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
128. Id. at 365-66.
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custody sexually violent predators are committed, has an 
obligation to provide treatment to individuals like
Hendricks.129
The concurrence strengthened the tepid requirement of
treatment by stating, “If, however, civil confinement were to
become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it 
were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to 
offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our 
precedents would not suffice to validate it.”130  Similarly, the dissent 
expressed strong reservations stating:
Kansas, however, concedes that Hendricks’ condition is 
treatable; yet the Act did not provide Hendricks (or others 
like him) with any treatment until after his release date 
from prison and only inadequate treatment thereafter.
These, and certain other, special features of the Act
convince me that it was not simply an effort to commit 
Hendricks civilly, but rather an effort to inflict further
punishment upon him.131
It appears, then, that the proscription against preventive
detention is not absolute but still not permissible except after strict 
due process and with some level of treatment necessary.
A. Using Findings of Fact in Treatment
The Minnesota Sex Offender Program has never discharged a 
single patient,132 indicating that MSOP’s policies need to be
examined to determine if they are indeed restorative or methods of 
detaining patients indefinitely.
It is virtually a universal practice among sex offender
treatment programs to require a patient to admit to every offense 
found in the committing courts findings of fact, whether the 
patient himself believes that he committed the offense or not.133
Treatment programs will accumulate a list of victims of the patients 
by culling them from criminal findings, criminal complaints,
criminal pleas, accusations, commitment findings, and past reports, 
129. Id. at 367.
130. Id. at 373.
131. Id.
132. See Janus, supra note 20.
133. Telephone Interview with Gerald Kaplan, Director of Alpha Human
Services, a private sex offender treatment program in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
(Aug. 29, 2002).
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such as pre-sentence investigations completed by the patients’ 
probation officers.134  The patient must take responsibility for each 
alleged incident or they will not be able to complete the program.
Programs are not required to investigate the veracity of the findings 
or reports; programs expect the patient to acknowledge the
findings regardless of the patient’s claims of inaccuracy.135
The rationale of treatment professionals for this policy is to 
encourage patients to accept responsibility for their behavior.136  In 
addition, proper evaluation of an offender’s history is essential to 
any treatment program,137 and is therefore performed early in the 
treatment process.  The patient is evaluated early in the treatment 
process.  The evaluation at MSOP involves an analysis of
documentation of offenses which includes the findings of fact from 
the commitment proceedings.138  It is not general practice in other 
clinical areas for treatment professionals to abdicate the
development of a clinical database to a court or to use a court’s 
findings of fact as a starting point for treatment.139
As a class, sex offenders may not be the best source of data.140
This is partly because they are generally in denial.  To overcome 
patients’ initial reluctance to admit elements of offenses, sex
offender treatment professionals insist firmly that patients take 
responsibility for an objective version of the offense.141  Similarly, 
134. Email from Anita Schlank, Clinical Director, Minnesota Sex Offender 
Program, regarding client findings.  Dr. Schlank directs clients to “work with their 
attorneys” to change the Findings of Fact if the patient/client is insistent that they 
are in error. Id.
135. Id.
136. Telephone Interview with Mark Willenbring, M.D., Staff Psychiatrist,
Addictions Unit, Minneapolis Veterans’ Administration Hospital (Aug. 28, 2002); 
Telephone Interview with Gerald Kaplan, Director of Alpha Human Services, a 
private sex offender treatment program in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Aug. 29, 
2002).
137. Telephone Interview with Mark Willenbring, M.D., Staff Psychiatrist,
Addictions Unit, Minneapolis Veterans’ Administration Hospital (Aug. 28, 2002).
138. Telephone Interview with Gerald Kaplan, Director of Alpha Human
Services, a private sex offender treatment program in Minneapolis, Minnesota 
(Aug. 29, 2002).
139. Telephone Interview with Mark Willenbring, M.D., Staff Psychiatrist,
Addictions Unit, Minneapolis Veterans’ Administration Hospital (Aug. 28, 2002).
140. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association 4th ed. 2000).  The majority of the patients at MSOP are —
diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder.  A characteristic of the Antisocial
Personality is habitual dishonesty.
141. Telephone Interview with Mark Willenbring, M.D., Staff Psychiatrist,
Addictions Unit, Minneapolis Veterans’ Administration Hospital (Aug. 28, 2002).
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chemical dependence programs also seek to overcome the patient’s 
denial, which is a central theme in the treatment of the chemically
dependent.142
It is not common, however, for them to search findings of fact 
to create an exhaustive list of “offenses.”  Treatment professionals’ 
insistence that patients confess to and express remorse for an 
offense they in fact did not commit has no clinical purpose and 
may have adverse clinical consequences.
The objections to strict compliance with this policy are that it 
is coercive, acceptance of false information creates cognitive
distortion, admissions may lead to further convictions, and there 
are limits on what an attorney may accomplish by way of amending 
findings.
B. Using Polygraph in Treatment
In order to graduate from MSOP, a patient must pass a
polygraph.143  The purported purpose of this test is to make sure 
that all victims have been accounted for.144  Polygraph technology, 
however, has very questionable validity.145  As with using findings of
fact for a database of victims, the use of a polygraph to develop a 
clinical database forsakes clinical judgment.146
Polygraphs were not developed by scientists147 and the method 
for estimating their reliability is flawed.148  The questionable validity 
142. E.g., The Disease of Addiction, Current Concepts, at
http://www.wemac.com/cdconcpt.html#hdwri (last visited Mar. 16, 2003);
Douglas Stellato-Kabat et. al, Treating Chemical Dependent Couples and Families,
available at http://www.drug-test.com/tcd.htm (last visited March 16, 2003).
143. MSOP Patient Handbook (App. 1).  This policy is not statutorily required.
144. Telephone Interview with Gerald Kaplan, Director of Alpha Human
Services, a private sex offender treatment program in Minneapolis, Minnesota 
(Aug. 29, 2002).
145. See DAVID T. LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD: USES AND ABUSES OF THE LIE
DETECTOR 49 (Plenum Press 1998).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 49.  Major figures in the development of the polygraph were lawyers 
and policemen, none of which had credentials as scientists.
148. Id. at 67–88.  The subjective method frequently used to verify accuracy is 
to compare the number of “deceptive” profiles with the number of confessions 
that result from the polygraph interviews.  Since persons who pass the polygraph 
generally are not re-interviewed, the sample of polygraphs that form the basis of 
the verification are those which the subject does not pass.  The subject is then re-
interviewed and told that he did not pass the polygraph.  When faced with this 
information, confessions often are forthcoming.  Dr. Lykken points out that 
numbers similar to the data thus compiled may be obtained if the subject’s 
polygraph is not analyzed at all but deception is determined by a flip of a coin.
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of polygraphy has been known for decades149 and polygraphs have 
never been widely accepted among scientists.150  Their use by 
clinicians in SPP/SDP retention decisions is therefore curious.
Even if polygraph reports are to be believed, they are not so 
reliable that they can be validated.  For example, even if collateral 
information conflicts with the polygraph results, failure of a
polygraph is still an absolute block to discharge.  The practice of 
requiring such an exam serves no purpose other than creating 
another reason for preventing discharge.
C. Emphasis of Confinement is Security Not Therapy
If, in fact, the confinement of persons committed as SPP/SDP 
is for the purpose of treatment, courts should focus their inquiry 
on the confinement portion of the program.  The dissents of 
Justices Wahl and Page take on increased credence if there is no 
true psychotherapeutic aim of the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program, i.e., if the program is a sham or a placebo.151
One method to determine whether the treatment program is a 
“sham” or “placebo” would be to look at the focus of the treatment 
program.  The focus of the treatment program at MSOP appears to 
be on preventing breaches of security and only tangentially on 
treatment.  A recent Minnesota Supreme Court case is illustrative.
In Hince v. O’Keefe, patients at MSOP sought a declaratory judgment 
requiring the Department of Human Services, which is the state 
agency responsible for the operation of MSOP, to establish a
Laboratory studies, because they do a poor job of simulating the high-
stakes scenario that exists in real-life criminal investigations, cannot be 
relied on to estimate polygraph (lie detector) accuracy.  Field studies 
that employ confessions following a failed polygraph also cannot be 
relied on for this purpose.  Credible field studies would be possible, 
but difficult to implement.  To date, no scientifically credible field 
study of the validity of the CQT (Control Question Test) in detecting 
guilty suspects has been accomplished.  However, as Patrick and Iacono 
showed, because police practices differ between cases that yield at least
one failed test and those that yield only passed tests, it is possible to 
collect data that bear on the accurately of the CQT for innocent 
subjects.
Id. at 88.
149. Jerome H. Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of 
Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961); David T. Lykken, Ph.D., Polygraph Tests in 
Business Unscientific, Unamerican, Illegal, HENNEPIN LAWYER, May-June 1976, at 4.
150. LYKKEN, supra note 145, at 49.
151. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn. 1994) (Wahl, J., dissenting);
Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d at 201 (Page, J., dissenting).
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hospital review board. 152
Prior to 1995, SPP/SDP committees were held and treated at 
the Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter, Minnesota.  In 1995, a 
new facility was built in Moose Lake, Minnesota, and the SPP/SDP 
committees transferred there.  At the time of the transfer, the new 
program (MSOP) was placed under its own administration and new 
rules were promulgated for its operation.  The Minnesota
Department of Human Services did not view MSOP as a “regional 
center”153 and did not provide for a review board.  MSOP is the only 
facility that admits persons thus committed and has two very high 
security locations.
The Commissioner of the Department of Human Services is 
required by statute to establish a review board at each of the 
regional treatment centers. 154  Review boards have two functions.
The first is to review the admission and retention of patients.155
With this function, the review board has the authority to advise the 
head of the regional treatment center if it believes the patient is 
inappropriately detained and recommend his or her release.156
The second function is to receive and investigate conditions
affecting the care of patients.157
In 1998, twenty-eight men committed as either a SPP or SDP 
brought suit against the Minnesota Department of Human Services
to establish a complaint review tribunal known as a “review board” 
at MSOP.158  The Commissioner of the Department of Human
Services refused to establish such a review board at the MSOP 
facilities on three grounds.  First, the Commissioner argued that no 
one committed as SPP or SDP may be released by any other means
than going before a “special review board” 159 (which is a completely
different entity).  Thus, the first function of the review board, to 
review admissions and retentions, was already being performed by 
152. 632 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Minn. 2001).
153. Minnesota’s state hospitals were renamed “regional centers” in 1986.
154. MINN. STAT. § 253B.22, subd. 1 (1998).
155. MINN. STAT. § 253B.22, subd. 4 (2000).  “Regional treatment centers” 
were formally known as “state hospitals” and are the state’s inpatient treatment 
programs for persons with mental illness, chemical dependence, or mental
retardation.  As a result of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Hince opinion, they are 
also for persons mentally ill and dangerous to the public, sexual psychopathic 
personalities, and sexually dangerous persons. Hince, 632 N.W.2d at 584.
156. MINN. STAT. § 253B.22, subd. 4.
157. Id.
158. Hince v. O’Keefe, 613 N.W.2d 784, 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
159. Hince, 632 N.W.2d at 583.
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the “special review board,” and therefore the legislature could not 
have meant that another review board was required at MSOP.
MSOP’s second argument was that a review board was unnecessary
because there are a number of other mechanisms to review
resident complaints.160  The third argument was that MSOP is not a 
regional treatment center,161 and therefore the statute requiring
establishment of a review board does not apply to MSOP.
The matter was dismissed at the district court and affirmed by 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals.162  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court and ordered the establishment of a review
board at MSOP.163
The Minnesota Supreme Court reinforced certain notions 
about SPP and SDP commitments in general.164  In its opinion, the 
court referred to persons committed as SPP and SDP as “patients,”
a term that the Department of Human Services has studiously 
avoided applying to these persons.  The opinion clearly reinforced 
the concept that the commitments are based on a mental disorder.
The court held:
[T]he state asserts that the district court properly
dismissed appellant’s action because SPP and SDP
patients are not ‘mentally ill’ and therefore Sex Offender 
Program facilities are not regional treatment centers.  The 
state’s argument gives us pause because when the state 
argued Blodgett, Linehan I, Linehan III, and Linehan IV, it 
argued that the parties suffered from mental disorders. 
Without the mental disorder component, commitment 
would be based on dangerousness alone, which does not 
satisfy due process. 165
The significance to the due process argument is that MSOP is 
clearly primarily concerned with maintaining a secure facility and 
that rehabilitation is secondary.  Yet, to avoid running afoul of the 
prohibition against double jeopardy, MSOP must make a good 
160. Id.
161. Id. at 583-84.
162. Id. at 579.
163. Id. at 585.
164. Id. at 580.  “The current civil commitment statutes for SPP and SDP are 
the product of a delicate balancing between the ‘legitimate public concern over 
the danger posed by predatory sex offenders’ and the fundamental right of those 
persons committed to live their lives ‘free of physical restraint by the state.’” Id.
(quoting In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 912, 914 (Minn. 1994)).
165. Id. at 583 (citations omitted); see also, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-
83 (1992); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
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faith effort at rehabilitation.  Further, equal protection demands 
that similarly situated individuals be treated similarly.  In addition 
to heightened security requirements for mentally ill and dangerous 
patients, there is a clear emphasis on treatment at Minnesota 
Security Hospital  (MSH).
D. Constitutional Challenges to Discharge Criteria
Another area where double jeopardy and preventive detention 
concerns are raised is the discharge criteria for SPP/SDP
commitments.  Following a pre-discharge commitment trial, the 
treating program (MSOP) must submit a treatment report to the 
trial court within sixty days.166  If the trial court finds that the 
person continues to be mentally ill and dangerous to the public,167
the commitment becomes indeterminate, that is, the person will 
remain in a secure treatment facility until statutory discharge 
criteria are met.168  The trial court then loses jurisdiction of the 
matter of discharge and the committed person must go through an 
administrative review process to be discharged.169
The criteria for discharge are that the person is no longer 
dangerous and that he can make an acceptable adjustment to the 
community.170  At first glance, a United States Supreme Court case,
Foucha v. Louisiana,171 seemed to create an argument for the ending
of sexual predator commitments.  In Foucha, the Court clearly 
required that there be something more than dangerousness in 
order to confine someone within a civil commitment scheme.172
Dangerousness must be accompanied by a mental illness.173  A 
Minnesota case, Reome v. Levine,174 also stands for the proposition 
that a patient still considered dangerous but no longer mentally ill 
may not be committed against his will.175  Earlier, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals held that the discharge statute must be read in 
166. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 2(a).
167. The person may have a sexual psychopathic personality or may be a 
sexually dangerous person.
168. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 3.  Before release from civil commitment, 
the patient must satisfy the requirements of § 253B. Id.
169. MINN. STAT.  § 253B.18, subd. 4c.
170. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18, subd. 7.
171. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
172. Id. at 78.
173. Id. at 78-79.
174. 692 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Minn. 1988).
175. Id. at 1053.
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conjunction with the commitment statute and that when a person 
is no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous because of mental 
illness, the person could no longer be detained.176  This clearly 
indicates that the dangerousness must arise from a mental illness.
The SPP statute was challenged and upheld on due process 
and equal protection grounds in two cases.177  In Call v. Gomez, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the SPP statute comported to 
the basic constitutional requirement that the commitment bear 
some reasonable relationship with the purpose of the original 
commitment and therefore the discharge criteria did not violate 
due process.178  In Caprice v. Gomez,179 patient Caprice argued that 
because he did not have a major mental illness, the discharge 
criteria could not apply to him.180  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
held that the statute did not violate the equal protection
requirement that similarly situated persons be treated similarly 
when applied to persons committed as mentally ill and
dangerous.181  This reasoning suggests that the commitment as a 
psychopathic personality is predicated on a mental illness.  This 
premise raises a problem for persons committed under the
SPP/SDP statutes.  The “psychiatric” conditions with which patients 
are diagnosed182 are, for the most part, conditions that are not
treatable within the traditional scheme of psychiatric treatment.183
Unlike mentally ill and dangerous committees, SPP committees 
have virtually no chance of having their psychiatric diagnoses
declared “in remission” and are therefore unable to take advantage
of the Foucha184 protections.
SPP and SDP commitments are based on the premise that the 
committed sex offenders had behavioral conditions that could be 
176. Reome v. Levine, 350 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
177. Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1995); Caprice v. Gomez, 552 
N.W.2d 753 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
178. 535 N.W.2d at 318-19 (Minn. 1995).
179. 552 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1996).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 758-59.
182. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed., text rev. 2002).  The most common diagnosis is that of 
antisocial personality disorder.
183. Id.  Treatment for psychosis includes antipsychotics; treatment for bipolar 
disorder includes mood stabilizers; treatment for depression includes
antidepressants and electroconvulsive therapy.
184. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
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treated.185  Although community protection may be part of the 
justification, without a good faith effort at therapeutic
rehabilitation, the entire scheme of civil commitment of sex
offenders who have completed their criminal sentences becomes 
preventive detention.
IV. CONCLUSION
A fine balance is needed between public safety and substantive 
and procedural due process.  Many of the due process protections 
available in traditional commitments are in flux in SPP/SDP
commitments, and at the present time, this balance is tipped in 
favor of public safety.  However, further litigation may change this 
balance.  A more critical area of litigation in the near future needs 
to focus on the treatment process.  If the rulings on double 
jeopardy are to remain valid, treatment must be shown to be 
rehabilitative and not merely a pretext for preventive detention.
185. See Linehan II, 557 N.W.2d 171, 188 (Minn. 1996).
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